India's Nuclear Policy

This book examines India's nuclear policy, doctrine, strategy and posture post-1998 tests, clarifying the elastic concept of "credible minimum deterrence" (CDM) at the center of the country's approach to nuclear security. The CDM concept, it is argued, permits the Indian nuclear forces to be beefed up, size and quality-wise, and to acquire strategic reach and clout, even as the qualifier "minimum" suggests an overarching concern for moderation and economical use of resources, and strengthens India's claims to be a "responsible" nuclear weapon state. The book also reveals the manner in which the Indian strategic deterrent is being operationalized. Based on interviews with Indian political leaders, nuclear scientists, and military and civilian nuclear policy planners, it provides unique insights into the workings of India's nuclear decision-making and deterrence system. Moreover, by juxtaposing the Indian nuclear policy and thinking against the theories of nuclear war and strategic deterrence, nuclear escalation, and nuclear coercion, offers a strong theoretical grounding for the Indian approach to nuclear war and peace, nuclear deterrence and escalation, nonproliferation and disarmament, and to limited war in a nuclearized environment. It refutes the alarmist notions about a "nuclear flashpoint" in South Asia, etc. which derive from stereotyped analysis of India-Pakistan "wars", and examines India\\\\\\\'s likely conflict scenarios involving China and, minorly, Pakistan. And it analyzes the India-US civilian nuclear cooperation deal, on balance, as disadvantaging India.